Multi-version concurrency control in TLA+

In a previous blog post, I talked about how we can use TLA+ to specify the serializability isolation level. In this post, we’ll see how we can use TLA+ to describe multi-version concurrency control (MVCC), which is a strategy for implementing transaction isolation. Postgres and MySQL both use MVCC to implement their repeatable read isolation levels, as well as a host of other databases.

MVCC is described as an optimistic strategy because it doesn’t require the use of locks, which reduces overhead. However, as we’ll see, MVCC implementations aren’t capable of achieving serializability.

All my specifications are in https://github.com/lorin/snapshot-isolation-tla.

Modeling MVCC in TLA+

Externally visible variables

We use a similar scheme as we did previously for modeling the externally visible variables. The only difference now is that we are also going to model the “start transaction” operation:

Variable nameDescription
opthe operation (start transaction, read, write, commit, abort), modeled as a single letter: {“s”, “r”, “w”, “c”, “a”} )
argthe argument(s) to the operation
rvalthe return value of the operation
trthe transaction executing the operation

The constant sets

There are three constant sets in our model:

  • Obj – the set of objects (x, y,…)
  • Val – the set of values that the objects can take on (e.g., 0,1,2,…)
  • Tr – the set of transactions (T0, T1, T2, …)

I associate the initial state of the database with a previously committed transaction T0 so that I don’t have to treat the initial values of the database as a special case.

The multiversion database

In MVCC, there can be multiple versions of each object, meaning that it stores multiple values associated with each object. Each of these versions is also has information on which transaction created it.

I modeled the database in TLA+ as a variable named db, here is an invariant that shows the values that db can take on:

It’s a function that maps objects to a set of version records. Each version record is associated with a value and a transaction. Here’s an example of a valid value for db:

Example db where Obj={x,y}

Playing the home game with Postgres

Postgres’s behavior when you specify repeatable read isolation level appears to be consistent with the MVCC TLA+ model I wrote so I’ll use it to illustrate some how these implementation details play out. As Peter Alvaro and Kyle Kingsbury note in their Jepsen analysis of MySQL 8.0.34, Postgres’s repeatable read isolation level actually implements snapshot isolation, while MySQL’s repeatable read isolation level actually implements …. um … well, I suggest you read the analysis.

I created a Postgres database named tla. Because Postgres defaults to read committed, I changed the default to repeatable read on my database so that it would behave more like my model.

ALTER DATABASE tla SET default_transaction_isolation TO 'repeatable read';

create table obj (
    k char(1) primary key,
    v int
);

insert into obj (k,v) values ('x', 0), ('y', 0);

Starting a transaction: id and visibility

In MVCC, each transaction gets assigned a unique id, and ids increase monotonically.

Transaction id: tid

I modeled this with a function tid that maps transactions to natural numbers. I use a special value called None for the transaction id for transactions who have not started yet.

When a transaction starts, I assign it an id by finding the largest transaction id assigned so far (mxid), and then adding 1. This isn’t efficient, but for a TLA+ spec it works quite nicely:

In Postgres, you can get the ID of the current transaction by using the pg_current_xact_id function. For examplle:

$ psql tla
psql (17.0 (Homebrew))
Type "help" for help.

tla=# begin;
BEGIN
tla=*# select pg_current_xact_id();
 pg_current_xact_id
--------------------
                822
(1 row)

Visible transactions: vis

We want each transaction to behave as if it is acting against a snapshot of the database from when the transaction started.

We can implement this in MVCC by identifying the set of transactions that have previously committed, and ensuring that our queries only read from writes done by these transactions.

I modeled this with a function called vis which maps each transaction to a set of other transactions. We also want our own writes to be visible, so we include the transaction being started in the set of visible transactions:

For each snapshot, Postgres tracks the set of committed transactions using three variables:

  1. xmin – the lowest transaction id associated with an active transaction
  2. xmax – (the highest transaction id associated with a committed transaction) + 1
  3. xip_list – the list of active transactions whose ids are less than xmax

In Postgres, you can use the pg_current_snapshot function, which returns xmin:xmax:xip_list:

tla=# SELECT pg_current_snapshot();
 pg_current_snapshot
---------------------
 825:829:825,827

Here’s a visualization of this scenario:

These three variables are sufficient to determine whether a particular version is visible. For more on the output of pg_current_snapshot, check out the Postgres operations cheat sheet wiki.

Performing reads

A transaction does a read using the Get(t, obj) operator. This operator retrieves the visible version with the largest transaction id:

Performing writes

Writes are straightforward, they simply add new versions to db. However, if a transaction did a previous write, that previous write has to be removed. Here’s part of the action that writes obj with value val for transaction t:

The lost update problem and how MVCC prevents it

Consider the following pair of transactions. They each write the same value and then commit.

A serializable execution history

This is a serializable history. It actually has two possible serializations: T1,T2 or T2,T1

Now let’s consider another history where each transaction does a read first.

A non-serializable execution history

This execution history isn’t serializable anymore. If you try to sequence these, the second read will read 2 where it should read 3 due to the previous write.

Serializability is violated: the read returns 2 instead of 3

This is referred to as the lost update problem.

Here’s a concrete example of the lost update problem. Imagine you’re using a record as a counter: you read the value, increment the result by one, and then write it back.

SELECT v FROM obj WHERE k='x';
-- returns 3
UPDATE obj set v=4 WHERE k='x';

Now imagine these two transactions run concurrently. If neither sees the other’s write, then one of these increments will be lost: you will have missed a count!

MVCC can guard against this by preventing two concurrent transactions from writing to the same object. If transaction T1 has written to a record in an active transaction, and T2 tries to write to the same record, then the database will block T2 until T1 either commits or aborts. If the first transaction commits, the database will abort the second transaction.

You can confirm this behavior in Postgres, where you’ll get an error if you try to write to a record that has previously been written to by a transaction that was active and then committed:

$ psql tla
psql (17.0 (Homebrew))
Type "help" for help.

tla=# begin;
BEGIN
tla=*# update obj set v=1 where k='x';
ERROR:  could not serialize access due to concurrent update
tla=!#

Interestingly, MySQL’s MVCC implementation does not prevent lost updates(!!!). You can confirm this yourself.

Implementing this in our model

In our model, a write is implemented by two actions:

  1. BeginWr(t, obj, val) – the initial write request
  2. EndWr(t, obj, val) – the successful completion of the write

We do not allow the EndWr action to fire if:

  1. There is an active transaction that has written to the same object (here we want to wait until the other transaction commits or aborts)
  2. There is a commit to the same object by a concurrent transaction (here we want to abort)

We also have an action named AbortWr that aborts if a write conflict occurs.

Deadlock!

There’s one problem with the approach above where we block on a concurrent write: the risk of deadlock. Here’s what happens when we run our model with the TLC model checker:

Here’s a diagram of this execution history:

The problem is that T1 wrote x first and T2 wrote y first, and then T1 got blocked trying to write y and T2 got blocked trying to write x. (Note that even though T1 started to write y before T2, T2 completed the write first).

We can deal with this problem by detecting deadlocks and aborting the affected transactions when they happen. We can detect deadlock by creating a graph of dependencies between transactions (just like in the diagram above!) and then look for cycles:

Here TC stands for transitive closure, which is a useful relation when you want to find cycles. I used one of the transitive closure implementations in the TLA+ examples repo.

Top-level of the specification

Here’s a top-level view of the specification, you can find the full MVCC specification in the repo (source, pdf):

Note how reads and writes have begin/end pairs. In addition, a BeginWr can end in an AbortWr if there’s a conflict or deadlock as discussed earlier.

For liveness, we can use weak fairness to ensure that read/write operations complete, transactions start, and that deadlock is detected. But for commit and abort, we need strong fairness, because we can have infinite sequences of BeginRd/EndRd pairs or BeginWr/EndWr pairs and Commit and Abort are not enabled in the middle of reads or writes.

My MVCC spec isn’t serializable

Now that we have an MVCC spec, we can check to see if implements our Serializable spec. In order to do that check, we’ll need to do a refinement mapping from MVCC to Serializable.

One challenge is that the initial state of the Serializable specification establishes the fate of all of the transactions and what their environments are going to be in the future:

The Init state for the Serializable spec

Adding a delay to the Serializability spec

In our MVCC spec, we don’t know in advance if a transaction will commit or abort. We could use prophecy variables in our refinement mapping to predict these values, but I didn’t want to do that.

What I did instead was to create a new specification, SerializabilityD (source, pdf), that delays these predictions until the second step of the behavior:

I could then do a refinement mapping MVCC ⇒ SerializabilityD without having to use prophecy variables.

Verifying that SerializabilityD actually implements Serializability

Note that it’s straightforward to do the SerializabilityD ⇒ Serializability refinement mapping with prophecy variables. You can find it in SerializabilityDRefinement (source, pdf):

The MVCC ⇒ SerializabilityD mapping

The MVCC ⇒ SerializabilityD refinement mapping is in the MVCCRefinement spec (source, pdf).

The general strategy here is:

  1. Execute MVCC until all of the transactions complete, keeping an execution history.
  2. Use the results of the MVCC execution to populate the SerializabilityD variables
  3. Step through the recorded MVCC execution history one operation at a time

The tricky part is step 2, because we need to find a serialization.

Attempting to find a serialization

Once we have an MVCC execution history, we can try to find a serialization. Here’s the relevant part of the SetFate action that attempts to select the to and benv variables from Serializability that will satisfy serializability:

Checking the refinement mapping

The problem with the refinement mapping is that we cannot always find a serialization. If we try to model check the refinement mapping, TLC will error because it is trying to CHOOSE from an empty set.

This MVCC execution history is a classic example of what’s called write skew. Here’s a visual depiction of this behavior:

A non-serializable execution history that is permitted by MVCC

Neither T1,T2 nor T2,t1 is a valid serialization of this execution history:

If we sequence T1 first, then the r[y,0] read violates the serialization. If we sequence T2 first, then the r[x,0] read violates it.

These constraints are what Adya calls anti-dependencies. He uses the abbreviation rw for short, because the dependency is created by a write from one transaction clobbering a read done by the other transaction, so the write has to be sequenced after the read.

Because snapshot isolation does not enforce anti-dependencies, it generates histories that are not serializable, which means that MVCC does not implement the Serializability spec.

Coda

I found this exercise very useful in learning more about how MVCC works. I had a hard time finding a good source to explain the concepts in enough detail for me to implement it, without having to read through actual implementations like Postgres, which has way too much detail. One useful resource I found was these slides on MVCC by Joy Arulraj at Georgia Tech. But even here, they didn’t have quite enough detail, and my model isn’t quite identical. But it was enough to help me get started.

I also enjoyed using refinement mapping to do validation. In the end, these were the refinement mappings I defined:

I’d encourage you to try out TLA+, but it really helps if you have some explicit system in mind you want to model. I’ve found it very useful for deepening my understanding of consistency models.

The carefulness knob

A play in one act

Dramatis personae

  • EM, an engineering manager
  • TL, the tech lead for the team
  • X, an engineering manager from a different team

Scene 1: A meeting room in an office. The walls are adorned with whiteboards with boxes and arrows.

EM: So, do you think the team will be able to finish all of these features by end of the Q2?

TL: Well, it might be a bit tight, but I think it should be possible, depending on where we set the carefulness knob.

EM: What’s the carefulness knob?

TL: You know, the carefulness knob! This thing.

TL leans over and picks a small box off of the floor and places it on the table. The box has a knob on it with numerical markings.

EM: I’ve never seen that before. I have no idea what it is.

TL: As the team does development, we have to make decisions about how much effort to spend on testing, how closely to hew to explicitly documented processes, that sort of thing.

EM: Wait, aren’t you, like, careful all of the time? You’re responsible professionals, aren’t you?

TL: Well, we try our best to allocate our effort based on what we estimate the risk to be. I mean, we’re a lot more careful when we do a database migration than we do when we fix a typo in the readme file!

EM: So… um… how good are you at actually estimating risk? Wasn’t that incident that happened a few weeks ago related to a change that was considered a low risk at the time?

TL: I mean, we’re pretty good. But we’re definitely not perfect. It certainly happens that we misjudge the risk sometimes. I mean, in some sense, isn’t every incident in some sense a misjudgment of risk? How many times do we really say, “Hoo boy, this thing I’m doing is really risky, we’re probably going to have an incident!” Not many.

EM: OK, so let’s turn that carefulness knob up to the max, to make sure that the team is careful as possible. I don’t want any incidents!

LM: Sounds good to me! Of course, this means that we almost certainly won’t have these features done by the end of Q2, but I’m sure that the team will be happy to hear…

EM: What, why???

TL picks up a marker off of the table and walks up to the whiteboard. She draws an x axis and y-axis. She labels the x-axis “carefulness” and the y-axis “estimated completion time”.

TL: Here’s our starting point: the carefulness knob is currently set at 5, and we can properly hit end of Q2 if we keep it at this setting.

EM: What happens if we turn up the knob?

TL draws an exponential curve.

EM: Woah! That’s no good. Wait, if we turn the carefulness knob down, does that mean that we can go even faster?

TL: If we did that, we’d just be YOLO’ing our changes, not doing validation. Which means we’d increase the probability of incidents significantly, which end up taking a lot of time to deal with. I don’t think we’d actually end up delivering any faster if we chose to be less careful than we normally are.

EM: But won’t we also have more incidents at a carefulness setting of 5 than at higher carefulness settings?

TL: Yes, there’s definitely more of a risk that a change that we incorrectly assess as low risk ends up biting us at our default carefulness level. It’s a tradeoff we have to make.

EM: OK, let’s just leave the carefulness knob at the default setting.


Scene 2: An incident review meeting, two and a half months later.

X: We need to be more careful when we make these sorts of changes in the future!

Fin


Coda

It’s easy to forget that there is a fundamental tradeoff between how careful we can be and how much time it will take us to perform a task. This is known as the efficiency-thoroughness trade-off, or ETTO principle.

You’ve probably hit a situation where it’s particularly difficult to automate the test for something, and doing the manual testing is time-intensive, and you developed the feature and tested it, but then there was a small issue that you needed to resolve, and then do you go through all of the manual testing again? We make these sort of time tradeoffs in the small, they’re individual decisions, but they add up, and we’re always under schedule pressure to deliver.

As a result, we try our best to adapt to the perceived level of risk in our work. The Human and Organizational Performance folks are fond of the visual image of the black line versus the blue line to depict the difference between how the work is supposed to be done with how workers adapt to get their work done.

But sometimes these adaptations fail. And when this happens, inevitably someone says “we need to be more careful”. But imagine if you explicitly asked that person at the beginning of a project about where they wanted to set that carefulness knob, and they had to accept that increasing the setting would increase the schedule significantly. If an incident happened, you could then say to them, “well, clearly you set the carefulness knob too low at the beginning of this project”. Nobody wants to explicitly make the tradeoff between less careful and having a time estimate that’s seen as excessive. And so the tradeoff gets made implicitly. We adapt as best we can to the risk. And we do a pretty good job at that… most of the time.

Specifying serializability in TLA+

Concurrency is really, really difficult for humans to reason about. TLA+ itself was borne out of Leslie Lamport’s frustration with the difficulty of write error-free concurrent algorithms:

When I first learned about the mutual exclusion problem, it seemed easy and the published algorithms seemed needlessly complicated.  So, I dashed off a simple algorithm and submitted it to CACM.  I soon received a referee’s report pointing out the error.  This had two effects.  First, it made me mad enough at myself to sit down and come up with a real solution.  The result was the bakery algorithm described in [12].  The second effect was to arouse my interest in verifying concurrent algorithms. 

Modeling concurrency control in database systems is a great use case for TLA+, so I decided to learn use TLA+ to learn more about database isolation. This post is about modeling serializability.

You can find all of the the TLA+ models referenced in this post in my snapshot-isolation-tla repo. This post isn’t about snapshot isolation at all, so think of the name as a bit of foreshadowing of a future blog post, which we’ll discuss at the end.

Modeling a database for reasoning about transaction isolation

In relational databases, data is modeled as rows in different tables, where each table has a defined set of named columns, and there are foreign key relationships between the tables.

However, when modeling transaction isolation, we don’t need to worry about those details. For the purpose of a transaction, all we care about is if any of the columns of a particular row are read or modified. This means we can ignore details about tables, columns, and relations. All we care about are the rows.

The transaction isolation literature talks about objects instead of rows, and that’s the convention I’m going to use. Think of an object like a variable that is assigned a value, and that assignment can change over time. A SQL select statement is a read, and a SQL update statement is a write.

An example of how we’re modeling the database

Note that the set of objects is fixed during the lifetime of the model, it’s only the values that change over time. I’m only going to model reads and writes, but it’s simple enough to extend this model to support creation and deletion by writing a tombstone value to model deletion, and having a not-yet-created-stone value to model an object that has not yet been created in the database.

I’ll use the notation r[obj, val] to refer to a read operation where we read the object obj and get the value val and w[obj, val] to mean where we write the value val to obj. So, for example, setting x=1 would be: w[x, 1], and reading the value of x as 1 would be r[x, 1].

I’m going to use Obj to model the set of objects, and Val to model the set of possible values that objects can take on.

Obj is the set of objects, Val is the set of values that can be assigned to objects

We can model the values of the objects at any point in time as a function that maps objects to values. I’ll call these sorts of functions environments (env for short) since that’s what people who write interpreters call them.

Example of an environment

As an example of syntax, here’s how we would assert in TLA+ that the variable env is a function that maps element of the set Obj to elements of the set Val:

What is serializability?

Here’s how the SQL:1999 standard describes serializability (via the Jepsen serializability page):

The execution of concurrent SQL-transactions at isolation level SERIALIZABLE is guaranteed to be serializable. A serializable execution is defined to be an execution of the operations of concurrently executing SQL-transactions that produces the same effect as some serial execution of those same SQL-transactions. A serial execution is one in which each SQL-transaction executes to completion before the next SQL-transaction begins.

An execution history of reads and writes is serializable if it is equivalent to some other execution history where the committed transactions are scheduled serially (i.e., they don’t overlap in time). Here’s an example of a serializable execution history.

Atul Adya famously came up with a formalism for database isolation levels (including serializability) in his PhD dissertation work, and published this in a paper co-authored by Barbara Liskov (his PhD advisor) and Patrick O’Neil (an author of the original log-structured merge-tree paper and one of the co-authors of the paper A Critique of ANSI SQL Isolation Levels, which pointed out problems in the SQL specification’s definitions of the isolation levels ).

Specifying serializability

Adya formalized database isolation levels by specifying dependencies between transactions. However, I’m not going to use Adya’s approach for my specification. Instead, I’m going to use a state-based approach, like the one used by Natacha Crooks, Youer Pu, Lorenzo Alvisi and Allen Clement in their paper Seeing is Believing: A Client-Centric Specification of Database Isolation.

It’s important to remember that a specification is just a set of behaviors (series of state transitions). We’re going to use TLA+ to define the set of all of the behaviors that we consider valid for serializability. Another way to put that is that our specification is the set of all serializable executions.

We want to make sure that if we build an implementation, all of the behaviors permitted by the implementation are a subset of our serializability specification.

Note: Causality is not required

Here’s an example of an execution history that is serializable according to the definition:

This looks weird to us because the write happens after the read: T1 is reading data from the future!

But the definition of serializability places no constraints on the ordering of the transaction, for that you need a different isolation level: strict serializability. But we’re modeling serializability, not strict serializability, so we allow histories like the one above in our specification.

(I’d say “good luck actually implementing a system that can read events from the future”, but in distributed databases when you’re receiving updates from different nodes at different times, some pretty weird stuff can happen…)

If you’d like to follow along as we go, my Serializable TLA+ model is in the github repo (source, pdf).

Externally visible variables

My specification will generate operations (e.g., reads, writes, commits, aborts). The four externally visible variables in the specification are:

Variable nameDescription
opthe operation (read, write, commit, abort), modeled as a single letter: {“r”, “w”, “c”, “a”} )
argthe argument(s) to the operation
rvalthe return value of the operation
trthe transaction executing the operation

Here’s the serializable example from earlier:

The execution history shown above can be modeled as a TLA+ behavior like this:

Initial state of the specification

We need to specify the set of valid initial states. In the initial state of our spec, before any operations are issued, we determine:

  1. which transactions will commit and which will abort
  2. the order in which the transactions will occur
  3. the value of the environment for each committed transaction at the beginning and at the end of its lifetime

This is determined by using three internal variables whose values are set in the initial state:

VariableDescription
fatefunction which encodes which transactions commit and which abort
totransaction order
benvthe value of the environments at the beginning/end of each transaction

We couldn’t actually implement a system that could predict in advance whether a transaction will commit or abort, but it’s perfectly fine to use these for defining our specification.

The values of these variables are specified like this:

In our initial state, our specification chooses a fate, ordering, and begin/end environments for each transaction. Where Orderings is a helper operator:

As an example, consider a behavior with three transactions fated to commit, where the fated transaction order is:

  1. T2
  2. T3
  3. T1

Furthermore, assume the following starting environments for each transaction:

T1: [x=2, y=5, z=3]
T2: [x=0, y=0, z=0]
T3: [x=0, y=1, z=0]
Finally, assume that the final environment state (once T1 completes) is [x=2,y=5,z=1].

We can visually depict the committed transactions like like this:

Reads and writes

You can imagine each transaction running in parallel. As long as each transaction’s behavior is consistent with its initial environment, and it ends up with its final environment the resulting behavior will be serializable. Here’s an example.

Each transaction has a local environment, tenv. If the transaction is fated to commit, its tenv is initialized to its benv at the beginning:

where:

Here’s an example that shows how tenv for transaction T3 varies over time:

benv is fixed, but tenv for each transaction varies over time based on the writes

If the transaction is fated to abort, then we don’t track its environment in tenv, since any read or write is valid.

A valid behavior, as the definition of serializability places no constraints on the reads of an aborted transaction

Actions permitted by the specification

The specification permits the following actions:

  1. commit transaction
  2. abort transaction
  3. read a value
  4. write a value

I’m not modeling the start of a transaction, because it’s not relevant to the definition of serializability. We just assume that all of the transactions have already started.

In TLA+, we specify it like this:

Note that there are no restrictions here on the order in which operations happen. Even if the transaction order is [T2, T3, T1], that doesn’t require that the operations from T2 have to be issued before the other two transactions.

Rather, the only constraints for each transaction that will commit is that:

  1. Its reads must be consistent with its initial environment, as specified by benv.
  2. Its local environment must match the benv of the next transaction in the order when it finally commits.

We enforce (1) in our specification by using a transaction-level environment, tenv, for the reads. This environment gets initialized to benv for each transaction, and is updated if the transaction does any writes. This enables each transaction to see its own writes.

We enforce (2) by setting a precondition on the Commit action that it can only fire when tenv for that transaction is equal to benv of the next transaction:

Termination

If all of the transactions have committed or aborted, then the behavior is complete, which is modeled by the Termination sub-action, which just keeps firing and doesn’t change any of the variables:

Liveness

In our specification, we want to ensure that every behavior eventually satisfies the Termination action. This means that all transactions either eventually commit or abort in every valid behavior of the spec. In TLA+, we can describe this desired property like this:

The diamond is a temporal operator that means “eventually”.

To achieve this property, we need to specify a liveness condition in our specification. This is a condition of the type “something we want to happen eventually happens”.

We don’t want our transactions to stay open forever.

  1. For transactions that are fated to abort, they must eventually abort
  2. For transactions that are fated to commit, they must eventually commit

We’re going to use weak and strong fairness to specify our liveness conditions; for more details on liveness and fairness, see my post a liveness example in TLA+.

Liveness for aborts

We want to specify that everyone transaction that is fated to abort eventually aborts. To do this, we can use weak fairness.

This says that “the Abort action cannot be forever enabled without the Abort action happening”.

Here’s the Abort action.

The abort action is enabled for a transaction t if the transaction is in the open state, and its fate is Aborted.

Liveness for commits

The liveness condition for commit is more subtle. A transaction can only commit if its local environment (tenv) matches the starting environment of the transaction that follows it in transaction order (benv).

Consider two scenarios: one where tenv matches the next benv, and one where it doesn’t:

We want to use fairness to specify that every transaction fated to commit eventually reaches the state of scenario 1 above. Note that scenario 2 is a valid state in a behavior, it’s just not a state from which a commit can happen.

Consider the following diagram:

For every value of tenv[Ti], the number of variables that match the values in benv[i+1] is somewhere between 0 and 5. In the example above, there are two variables that match, x and z.

Note that the Commit action is always enabled when a transaction is open, so with every step of the specification, tenv can move left or right in the diagram above, with a min of 0 and a max of 5.

We need to specify “tenv always eventually moves to the right”. When tenv is at zero, we can use weak fairness to specify that it eventually moves from 0 to 1.

To specify this, I defined a function W(0, 1) which is true when tenv moves from 0 to 1:

Where M(env1, env2) is a count of the number of variables that have the same value:

This means we can specify “tenv cannot forever stay at 0” using weak fairness, like this:

We also want to specify that tenv eventually moves from 1 matches to 2, and then from 2 to 3, and so on, all of the way from 4 to all 5. And then we also want to say that it eventually goes from all matches to commit.

We can’t use weak fairness for this, because if tenv is at 1, it can also change to 0. However, the weak fairness of W(0,1) ensures that it if it goes from 1 down to 0, it will always eventually go back to 1.

Instead, we need to use strong fairness, which says that “if the action is enabled infinitely often, then the action must be taken”. We can specify strong fairness for each of the steps like this:

Recall that Obj is the set of objects {x, y, z, …}, and Cardinality refres to the size of the set. We also need to specify strong fairness on the commit action, to ensure that we eventually commit if all variables matching is enabled infinitely often:

Now putting it all together, here’s one way to specify the liveness condition, which is conventionally called L.

Once again, the complete model is in the github repo (source, pdf).

How do we know our spec is correct?

We can validate our serializable specification by creating a refinement mapping to a sequential specification. Here’s a simple sequential specification for a key-value store, Sequential.tla:

I’m not going to get into the details of the refinement mapping in this post, but you can find it at in the SerializabilityRefinement model (source, pdf).

OK, but how do you know that this spec is correct?

It’s turtles all of the way down! This is really the bottom in terms of refinement, I can’t think of an even simpler spec that we can use to validate this one.

However, one thing we can do is specify invariants that we can use to validate the specification, either with the model checker or by proof.

For example, here’s an invariant that checks whether each write has an associated read that happened before:

where:

But what happens if there’s no initial write? In that case, we don’t know what the read should be. But we do know that we don’t want to allow two successive reads to read different values, for example:

r[x,3], r[x,4]

So we can also specify this check as an invariant. I called that SuccessiveReads, you can find it in the MCSequential model (source, pdf).

The value of formalizing the specification

Now that we have a specification for Serializability, we can use it to check if a potential concurrency control implementation actually satisfies this specification.

That was my original plan for this blog post, but it got so long that I’m going to save that for a future blog post. In that future post, I’m going to model multi-version concurrency control (MVCC) and show how it fails to satisfy our serializability spec by having the model checker find a counterexample.

However, in my opinion, the advantage of formalizing a specification is that it forces you to think deeply about what it is that you’re specifying. Finding counter-examples with the model checker is neat, but the real value is the deeper understanding you’ll get.

If you don’t examine what worked, how will you know what works?

This is one of my favorite bits from fellow anglophone Québécois Norm McDonald:

Norm: not a lung expert

One of the goals I believe that we all share for post-incident work is to improve the system. For example, when I wrote the post Why I don’t like discussing action items during incident reviews, I understood why people would want to focus on action items: precisely because they share this goal of wanting to improve the system (As a side note, Chris Evans of incident.io wrote a response: Why I like discussing actions items in incident reviews). However, what I want to write about here is not the discussion of action items, but focusing on what went wrong versus what went right.

“How did things go right?”

How did things go right is a question originally posed by the safety researcher Erik Hollnagel, in his the safety paradigm that he calls Safety-II. The central idea is that things actually go right most of the time, and if you want to actually improve the system, you need to get a better understanding of how the system functions, which means you need to broaden your focus beyond the things that broke.

You can find an approachable introduction to Safety-II concepts in the EUROCONTROL white paper From Safety-I to Safety-II. Hollnagel’s ideas have been very influential in the resilience engineering community. As an example, check out my my former colleague Ryan Kitchens’s talk at SREcon Americas 2019: How Did Things Go Right? Learning More from Incidents.

It’s with this how did things go right lens that I want to talk a little bit about incident review.

Beyond “what went well”

Now, in most incident writeups that I’ve read, there is a “what went well” section. However, it’s typically the smallest section in the writeup, with maybe a few bullet points: there’s never any real detail there.

Personally, I’m looking for details like how an experienced engineer recognized the symptoms enough to get a hunch about where to look next, reducing the diagnostic time by hours. Or how engineers leveraged an operational knob that was originally designed for a different purpose. I want to understand how experts are able to do the work of effectively diagnosing problems, mitigating impact, and remediating the problem.

Narrowly, I want to learn this because I want to get this sort of working knowledge into other people’s heads. More broadly, I want to bring to light the actual work that gets done.

We don’t know how the system works

Safety researchers make a distinction between work-as-imagined and work-as-done. We think we understand how the day-to-day work gets done, but we actually don’t. Not really. To take an example from software, we don’t actually know how people really use the tooling to get their work done, and I can confirm this by being on-call for internal support for development tools in previous jobs. (“You’re using our tool to do what?” is not an uncommon reaction from the on-call person). People do things we never imagined, in both wonderful and horrifying ways (sometimes at the same time!).

We also don’t see all of the ways that people coordinate to get their work done. There are the meetings, the slack messages, the comments on the pull requests, but there’s also the shared understanding, the common knowledge, the stuff that everybody knows that everybody else knows, that enables people to get this work done, while reducing the amount of explicit communication that has to happen.

What’s remarkable is that these work patterns, well, they work. These people in your org are able to get their stuff done, almost all of the time. Some of them may exhibit mastery of the tooling, and others may use the tooling in ways even it was never intended that are fundamentally unsafe. But we’re never going to actually know unless we actually look at how they’re doing their work.

Because how people do their work is how the system works. And if we’re going to propose and implement interventions, it’s very likely that the outcomes of the interventions will surprise us, because these changes might disrupt effective ways of doing work, and people will adapt to those interventions in ways we never anticipated, and in ways we may never even know if we don’t take a look.

Then why use incidents to look at things that go right?

At first glance, it does seem odd to use incidents as the place to examine where work goes well: given that incidents are times where something unquestionably went wrong. It would be wonderful if we could study how work happens when things are going well. Heck, I’d love to see companies have sociologists or anthropologists on staff to study how the work happens at the company. Regrettably, though, incidents are one of the only times when the organization is actually willing to devote resources (specifically, time) on examining work in fine-grained detail.

We can use incidents to study how things go well, but we have to keep a couple of things in mind. One, we need to recognize that adaptations that fail led to an incident are usually successful, which is why people developed those adaptations. Note that because an adaptation usually works, doesn’t mean that it’s a good thing to keep doing: an adaptation could be a dangerous workaround to a constraint like a third-party system that can’t be changed directly and so must be awkwardly worked around.

Second, we need to look in more detail, to remark, at incident response that is remarkable. When incident response goes well, there is impressive diagnostic, coordination, and improvisation work to get the system back to healthy. These are the kinds of skills you want to foster across your organization. If you want to build tools to make this work even better, you should take the time to understand just how this work is done today. Keep this in mind when you’re proposing new interventions. After all, if you don’t examine what worked, how will you know what works?

A liveness example in TLA+

If you’ve ever sat at a stop light that was just stuck on red, where there was clearly a problem with the light where it wasn’t ever switching green, you’ve encountered a liveness problem with a system.

Is the turning light just taking a long time? Or is it broken?

A liveness property of a specification is an assertion that some good thing eventually happens. In the case above, the something good is the light changing from red to green. If the light never turns green, then the system’s behavior violates the liveness property.

On the other hand, a safety property is an assertion that some bad thing never happens. To continue with the stop light example, you never want both the north-south and east-west traffic lights to be green at the same time. If those lights are both ever green simultaneously, then the system’s behavior violates the safety property. But this post is about liveness, not safety.

I’m going to walk through a simple TLA+ example that demonstrates why and how to specify liveness properties. Instead of using stop lights as my example, I’m going to use elevators.

A simple elevator specification

I’m going to build a minimalist TLA+ model of an elevator system. I’m going to model a building with N floors, and a single elevator, where the elevator is always either:

  • at a floor
  • between two floors

To keep things very simple, I’m not going to model things like passengers, doors, or call buttons. I’m just going to assume the elevator moves up and down in the building on its own.

To start with, the only constraint I’m going to put on the way the elevator moves is that it can’t change directions when it’s between two floors. For example, if the elevator is on floor 2, and then starts moving up, and is between floors 2 and 3, it can’t change direction and go back to floor 2: it has to continue on to floor 3. Once it’s on floor 3, it can go up or down. (Note: this is an example of a safety property).

My model is going to have two variables:

  • i – a natural number between 1 and 2×(# of floors) – 1
  • dir – the direction that the elevator is moving in (Up or Dn)

Assume we are modeling a building with 3 floors, then i would range from 1 to 5, and here’s how we would determine the floor that the elevator was on based on i.

ifloor
11
2between 1 and 2
32
4between 2 and 3
53

Note that when i is odd, the elevator is at a floor, and when even, the elevator is between floors. I use a hyphen (-) to indicate when the elevator is between floors.

Here’s a TLA+ specification that describes how this elevator moves. The spec permits four actions:

  • UpFlr – move up when at a floor
  • UpBetween – move up when between floors
  • DnFlr – move down when at a floor
  • DnBetween – move down when between floors
---- MODULE elevator ----
EXTENDS Naturals

CONSTANTS N, Up, Dn
ASSUME N \in Nat

VARIABLES i, dir

(* True when elevator is at floor f *)
At(f) == i+1 = 2*f

(* True when elevator is between floors *)
IsBetween == i % 2 = 0

Init == /\ i = 1
        /\ dir \in {Up, Dn}

(* move up when at a floor *)
UpFlr == /\ \E f \in 1..N-1 : At(f)
         /\ i' = i + 1
         /\ dir' = Up

(* move up when between floors *)
UpBetween == /\ IsBetween
             /\ dir = Up
             /\ i' = i + 1
             /\ UNCHANGED dir

(* move down when at a floor *)
DnFlr == /\ \E f \in 2..N : At(f)
         /\ i' = i-1
         /\ dir' = Dn

(* move down when between floors *)
DnBetween == /\ IsBetween
             /\ dir = Dn
             /\ i' = i - 1
             /\ UNCHANGED dir

Next == \/ UpFlr
        \/ UpBetween
        \/ DnFlr
        \/ DnBetween

v == <<i, dir>>
Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_v

====

Avoiding getting stuck

We don’t want the elevator to get stuck forever between two floors.

We’re trying to avoid this happening forever

Getting stuck is an example of a liveness condition. It’s fine for the elevator to sometimes be in the state i=2. we just want to ensure that it never stays in that state forever.

We can express this desired property using temporal logic. I’m going to use the diamond <> operator, which means “eventually”, and the box [] operator, which means “always”. Here’s how I expressed the desired property that the elevator doesn’t get stuck:

GetsStuckBetweenFloors == <>[]IsBetween
DoesntGetsStuckBetweenFloors == ~GetsStuckBetweenFloors

In English, GetsStuckBetweenFloors states: eventually, the elevator is always between floors. And then we define DoesntGetsStuckBetweenFloors as the negation of that.

We can check this property in the TLC model checker, by specifying it as a property in the config file:

PROPERTY 
    DoesntGetsStuckBetweenFloors

If we check this with the spec from above, the model checker will find a behavior that is permitted by our specification, but that violates this property.

The behavior looks like this, floor: [1, -, -, -, …]. The elevator moves up between floors and then gets stuck there, exactly what we don’t want to happen.

Our specification as initially written does not prevent this kind of behavior. We need to add additional constraints to our specification so that the spec does not permit behaviors where the elevator gets stuck forever.

Specifying liveness with fairness properties

One thing we could do is simply conjoin the DoesntGetsStuckBetweenFloors property to our specification.

Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_v /\ ~<>[]IsBetween

This would achieve the desired effect, our spec would no longer permit behaviors where the elevator gets stuck between floors.

The problem with adding liveness constraints by adding an arbitrary temporal property to your spec is that you can end up unintentionally adding additional safety constraints to your spec. That makes your spec harder to reason about. Lamport provides a detailed example of how this can happen in chapter 4 of his book A Science of Concurrent Programs.

Conjoining arbitrary temporal logic expressions to your specification to specify liveness properties makes Leslie Lamport sad

In order to make it easier for a human to reason about a specification, we always want to keep our safety properties and our liveness properties separate. This means that when we add liveness properties to our spec, we want to guarantee that we don’t do it in such a way that we end up adding new safety properties as well.

We can ensure that we don’t accidentally sneak in any new safety properties by using what are called fairness properties to achieves our desired liveness property.

Using weak fairness to avoid getting stuck

Weak fairness of an action says that if the action A is forever enabled, then eventually there is an A step. That’s not a very intuitive concept, so I find the contrapositive more useful: If weak fairness of action A is true, then it cannot be that the system gets “stuck” forever in a state where it could take an A step, but doesn’t.

In TLA+, we specify weak fairness of an action like this:

WF_v(A)

This means that it can’t happen that A eventually becomes forever enabled without eventually taking an A step, where the A step changes the variable expression v (that means v’ has to be different from v).

We have two actions that fire when the elevator is between floors: UpBetween (when it’s between floors, going up), and DnBetween (when it’s between floors going down).

We can define our liveness condition like this:

L == WF_v(UpBetween) /\ WF_v(DnBetween)

Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_v /\ L

This says that if the model cannot be in a state forever where UpBetween is enabled but the UpBetween action never happens, and similarly for DnBetween.

And now the model checker returns success!

Visiting every floor

In our specification, we’d also like to guarantee that the elevator always eventually visits every floor, so that nobody is ever eternally stranded waiting for an elevator to arrive.

Here’s how I wrote this property: it’s always that true that, for every floor, the elevator eventually visits that floor:

VisitsEveryFloor == [] \A f \in 1..N : <>At(f)

If we check this property against our spec with TLC, it quickly finds a counterexample, the scenario where the elevator just sits on the ground floor forever! It looks like this: floor [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ….]

We previously added weak fairness constraints for when the elevator is between floors. We can add additional fairness constraints so that the elevator can’t get stuck on any floors, that if it can move up or down, it has to eventually do so. Our liveness condition would look like this:

L == /\ WF_v(UpBetween)
     /\ WF_v(DnBetween)
     /\ WF_v(UpFlr)
     /\ WF_v(DnFlr)

But adding these fairness conditions don’t satisfy the VisitsEveryFloor property either! Here’s the counterexample:

In this counter-example, the behavior looks like this: floor [1, -, 2, -, 1, -, 2, -, …]. The elevator is cycling back and forth between floor 1 and floor 2. In particular, it never goes up past floor 2. We need to specify fairness conditions to prohibit a behavior like this.

Weak fairness doesn’t work here because the problem isn’t that the elevator is getting stuck forever on floor 2. Instead, it’s forever going back and forth between floors 1 and 2.

The elevator isn’t getting stuck, but it also is never going to floor 3

There’s a different fairness property, called strong fairness, which is similar to weak fairness, except that it also applies not just if the system gets stuck forever in a state, but also if a system goes in and out of that state, as long as it enters that state “infinitely often”. Basically, if it toggles forever in and out of that state, then you can use strong fairness to enforce an action in that state.

Which is exactly what the case is with our elevator, we want to assert that if the elevator reaches floor 2 infinitely often, it should eventually keep going up. We could express that using strong fairness like this:

SF_v(UpFlr /\ At(2))

Except that we don’t want this fairness condition to only apply at floor 2: we want it to apply for every floor (except the top floor). We can write it like this:

\A f \in 1..N-1: SF_v(UpFlr /\ At(f))

If we run the model checker again (where N=3), it still finds a counter-example(!):

Now the elevator does this: [1, -, 2, -, 3, 3, 3, 3, …]. It goes to the top floor and just stays there. It hits every floor once, but that’s not good enough for us: we want it to always eventually hit every floor.

We need to add some additional fairness conditions so that it the elevator also always eventually goes back down. Our liveness condition now looks like this:

L == /\ WF_v(UpBetween)
     /\ WF_v(DnBetween)
     /\ \A f \in 1..N-1: SF_v(UpFlr /\ At(f))
     /\ \A f \in 2..N: SF_v(DnFlr /\ At(f))

And this works!

Weak fairness on UpFlr and DnFlr is actually sufficient to prevent the elevators from getting stuck at the bottom or top floor, but we need strong fairness in the middle floors to ensure that the elevators always eventually visit every single floor.

The final liveness condition I used was this:

L == /\ WF_v(UpBetween)
     /\ WF_v(DnBetween)
     /\ WF_v(UpFlr /\ At(1))
     /\ WF_v(DnFlr /\ At(N))
     /\ \A f \in 2..N-1 :
        /\ SF_v(UpFlr /\ At(f))
        /\ SF_v(DnFlr /\ At(f))

You can find my elevator-tla repo on GitHub, including the config files for checking the model using TLC.

Why we need to specify fairness for each floor

You might be wondering why we need to specify the (strong) fairness condition for every floor. Instead of doing:

L == /\ WF_v(UpBetween)
     /\ WF_v(DnBetween)
     /\ WF_v(UpFlr)
     /\ WF_v(DnFlr)
     /\ \A f \in 2..N-1 :
        /\ SF_i(UpFlr /\ At(f))
        /\ SF_i(DnFlr /\ At(f))

Why can’t we just specify strong fairness of the UpFlr and DnFlr actions?

L == /\ WF_v(UpBetween)
     /\ WF_v(DnBetween)
     /\ SF_v(UpFlr)
     /\ SF_v(DnFlr)

The model checker can provide us with a counterexample to help explain why this liveness property doesn’t guarantee that the elevator always eventually visits all floors:

Here’s the pattern: [1,-,2,-,1,-,2,-,1,…]. We saw this behavior earlier, where the elevator just moves back and forth between floor 1 and floor 2.

The problem is that both SF_v(UpFlr) and SF_v(DnFlr) are satisfied by this behavior, because the elevator always eventually goes up (from floor 1) and always eventually goes down (from floor 2).

If we want the elevator to eventually visit every floor, then we need to specify the fairness conditions separately for each floor.

Further reading

Hillel Wayne’s blog posts are always a great introduction to TLA+ concepts:

For more details on implementing liveness properties in TLA+, I recommend Leslie Lamport’s book A Science of Concurrent Programs.

Finally, if you are interested in what a more realistic elevator model looks like in TLA+ , check out Andrew Helwer’s MultiCarElevator example.

Futexes in TLA+

Justine Tunney recently wrote a blog post titled The Fastest Mutexes where she describes how she implemented mutexes in Cosmopolitan Libc. The post discusses how her implementation uses futexes by way of Mike Burrows’s nsync library. From her post

nsync enlists the help of the operating system by using futexes. This is a great abstraction invented by Linux some years ago, that quickly found its way into other OSes. On MacOS, futexes are called ulock. On Windows, futexes are called WaitOnAddress(). The only OS Cosmo supports that doesn’t have futexes is NetBSD, which implements POSIX semaphores in kernelspace, and each semaphore sadly requires creating a new file descriptor. But the important thing about futexes and semaphores is they allow the OS to put a thread to sleep. That’s what lets nsync avoid consuming CPU time when there’s nothing to do.

Before I read this post, I had no idea what futexes were or how they worked. I figured a good way to learn would be to model them in TLA+.

Note: I’m going to give a simplified account of how futexes work. In addition, I’m not an expert on this topic. In particular, I’m not a kernel programmer, so there may be important details I get wrong here.

Mutexes

Readers who have done multithreaded programming before are undoubtedly familiar with mutexes: they are a type of lock that allows the programmer to enforce mutual exclusion, so that we can guarantee that at most one thread accesses a resource, such as a shared variable.

The locking mechanism is implemented by the operating system: locking and unlock the mutex ultimately involves a system call. If you were programming in C on a Unix-y system like Linux, you’d use the pthreads API to access the mutex objects. Which pthreads implementation you use (e.g., glibc, musl) will make the relevant system calls for you.

#include <pthread.h>
...
// create a mutex
pthread_mutex_t mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;

pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
// mutex is now locked

pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
// mutex is now unlocked

Modeling a mutex in TLA+

Before we get into futexes, let’s start off by modeling desired behavior of a mutex in TLA+. I’ll use the PlusCal algorithm language for my model, which can be translated directly to a TLA+ model (see my mutex.tla file)

---- MODULE mutex ----
CONSTANT Processes

(*--algorithm MutualExclusion

variables lock = {};

process proc \in Processes 
begin

ncs:  skip;
acq:  await lock = {};
      lock := {self};
cs:   skip;
rel:  lock := lock \ {self};
      goto ncs;
end process;

end algorithm;
*)

Modeling threads (Processes)

This model defines a fixed set of Processes. You should really think of these as threads, but there’s a convention in academia to refer to them as processes, so I used that convention. You can think of Processes in this model as a set of threads ids.

Modeling the lock

This model has only explicit variable, named lock, which is my model for the mutex lock. I’ve modeled it as a set. When the lock is free, the set is empty, and when the lock is held by a process, the set contains a single element, the process id.

Process states

PlusCal models also have an implicit variable, pc for program counter. The program counter indicates which state each process is in.

Each process can be in one of four states. We need to give a label to each of these states in our model.

LabelDescription
ncsin the non-critical section (lock is not held)
acqwaiting to acquire the lock
csin the critical section (lock is held)
relreleasing the lock

We want to make sure that two processes are never in the critical section at the same time. We can express this desired property in TLA+ like this:

InCriticalSection(p) == pc[p] = "cs"
MutualExclusion == \A p1,p2 \in Processes : InCriticalSection(p1) /\ InCriticalSection(p2) => p1 = p2

We can specify MutualExclusion as an invariant and use the TLC model checker to verify that our specification satisfies this property. Check out mutex.cfg for how to configure TLC to check the invariant.

Overhead of traditional mutexes

With a traditional mutex, the application make a system call every time the mutex is locked or unlocked. If the common usage pattern for an application is that there’s only one thread that tries to take the mutex, then you’re paying a performance penalty for having to execute those system calls. If the mutex is being acquired and released in a tight loop, then the time that goes to servicing the system calls could presumably be a substantial fraction of the execution time of the loop.

for(...) {
  pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
  // do work here
  pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
}

I don’t know how high these overheads are in practice, but Justine Tunney provides some numbers in her blog post as well as a link to Mark Waterman’s mutex shootout with more performance numbers.

Ideally, we would only pay the performance penalty for system calls when the mutex was under contention, when there were multiple threads that were trying to acquire the lock.

Futexes: avoid the syscalls where possible

Futexes provide a mechanism for avoiding system calls for taking a mutex lock in cases where the lock is not under contention.

More specifically, futexes provide a set of low-level synchronization primitives. These primitives allow library authors to implement mutexes in such a way that they avoid making system calls when possible. Application programmers don’t interact with futexes directly, they’re hidden behind APIs like pthread_mutex_lock.

Primitives: wait and wake

The primary two futex primitives are a wait system call and a wake system call. Each of them take an integer pointer as an argument, which I call futex. Here’s a simplified C function prototype for each of them.

void futex_wait(int *futex); 
void futex_wake(int *futex);

(Actual versions of these return status codes, but I won’t be using those return codes in this blog post).

Note that the futex_wait prototype shown above is incomplete: it needs to take an additional argument to guarantee correctness, but we’ll get to that later. I want to start off by providing some intuition on how to use futexes.

When a thread calls the futex_wait system call, the kernel puts the thread to sleep until another thread calls futex_wake with the same futex argument.

Using primitives to build mutexes that avoid system calls

OK, so how do we actually use these things to create mutexes?

Here’s a naive (i.e., incorrect) implementation of lock and unlock functions that implement mutual exclusion using the futex calls. The lock function checks if the lock is free. If it is, it takes the lock, otherwise it waits to be woken up and then tries again.

#define FREE 0
#define ACQUIRED 1
#define CONTENDED 2

void futex_wait(int *futex);
void futex_wake(int *futex);

/**
 * Try to acquire the lock. On failure, wait and then try again.
 */
void lock(int *futex) {
    bool acquired = false;
    while (!acquired) {
        if (*futex == FREE) {
            *futex = ACQUIRED;
            acquired = true;
        }
        else {
            *futex = CONTENDED;
            futex_wait(futex, CONTENDED);
        }
    }
}

/**
 * Release lock, wake threads that are waiting on lock
 */
void unlock(int *futex) {
    int prev = *futex;
    *futex = FREE;

    if(prev == CONTENDED) {
        futex_wake(futex);
    }
}

Note that futex is just an ordinary pointer. In the fast path, the lock function just sets the futex to ACQUIRED, no system call is necessary. It’s only when the futex is not free that it has to make the futex_wait system call.

Similarly, on the unlock side, it’s only when the futex is in the CONTENDED state that the futex_wake system call happens.

Now’s a good time to point out that futex is short for fast userspace mutex. The reason it’s fast is because we can (sometimes) avoid system calls. And the reason we are able to avoid system calls is that, in the fast path, the threads coordinate by modifying a memory location that is accessible in userspace. By userspace, we mean that our futex variable is just an ordinary pointer that the threads all have direct access to: no system call is required to modify it.

By contrast, when we call futex_wait and futex_wake, the kernel needs to read and modify kernel data structures, hence a system call is required.

The code above should provide you with an intuition of how futexes are supposed to work. The tricky part is writing the algorithm in such a way as to guarantee correctness for all possible thread schedules. There’s a reason that Ulrich Drepper wrote a paper titled Futexes are Tricky: it’s easy to get the lock/unlock methods wrong.

Why futex_wait needs another agument

There are many potential race conditions in our initial lock/unlock implementation, but let’s focus on one in particular: if the futex gets freed after the lock checks if it’s free, but before calling futex_wait.

Here’s what the scenario looks like (think of the red arrows as being like breakpoints):

We need to prevent the situation where the unlock thread completes after the *futex == FREE check but before the futex_wait system call.

We can prevent this by modifying the futex_wait function prototype to pass the value we expect the futex to have, it looks like this:

void futex_wait(int *futex, int val);

The lock code then looks like this instead:

void lock(int *futex) {
    if(*futex == FREE) {
        *futex = ACQUIRED;
    } else {
        *futex = CONTENDED;
        futex_wait(futex, CONTENDED);
        // try again after waking up
        lock(futex); 
    }
}

The futex_wait system call will check to ensure that *futex == val. So, if the *futex gets changed, the function will return immediately rather than sleeping.

Here’s the FUTEX_WAIT section of the Linux futex man page, which hopefully should be clear now.

FUTEX_WAIT (since Linux 2.6.0)
This operation tests that the value at the futex word pointed to by the address uaddr still contains the expected value val, and if so, then sleeps waiting for a FUTEX_WAKE operation on the futex word. The load of the value of the futex word is an atomic memory access (i.e., using atomic machine instructions of the respective architecture). This load, the comparison with the expected value, and starting to sleep are performed atomically and totally ordered with respect to other futex operations on the same futex word. If the thread starts to sleep, it is considered a waiter on this futex word. If the futex value does not match val, then the call fails immediately with the error EAGAIN.

Atomic operations

In order for the lock/unlock implementations to guarantee correctness, we need to rely on what are called atomic operations when reading and modifying the futex across multiple threads. These are operations that the hardware guarantees can be performed atomically, so that there are no possible race conditions.

In my futex model, I assumed the existence of three atomic operations:

  1. atomic store
  2. atomic exchange
  3. atomic compare and exchange

Atomic store isn’t very interesting, it just says that we can atomically set the value of a variable, i.e., that when we do something like this, it happens atomically.

*futex = FREE

In PlusCal, atomic stores are just modeled as assigning a value to a variable, so there’s not much else to sta

Atomic exchange

Atomic exchange looks like this:

oldval = atomic_exchange(x, newval)

You give atomic exchange two arguments: a variable (x) you want to modify, and the new value (newval) you want it to have. The atomic_exchange function will atomically set x=newval and return the value x had before the assignment.

In PlusCal, I modeled it as a macro. Macros can’t return values, so we need to pass in oldval as an argument.

macro atomic_exchange(x, oldval, newval) begin
    oldval := x;
    x := newval;
end macro;

Then I can invoke it like this in my PlusCal model:

atomic_exchange(mem[a], uprev, Free);

And the resulting behavior is:

uprev := mem[a];
mem[a] := Free;

Atomic compare and exchange

Atomic compare and exchange is sometimes called test-and-set. It looks like this:

oldval = atomic_compare_exchange(x, expecting, newval)

It’s similar to atomic exchange, except that it only performs the exchange if the variable x contains the value expecting. Basically, it’s an atomic version of this:

if (x == expecting) 
  oldval = atomic_compare_exchange(x, newval)
else 
  oldval = x

In my PlusCal model, I also implemented it as a macro:

macro atomic_compare_exchange(x, oldval, expecting, newval) begin
    oldval := x;
    if x = expecting then 
        x := newval;
    end if;
end macro;

Futex modeling basics

Here are the basics constants and variables in my model:

CONSTANTS Processes, Addresses, Free, Acquired, Contended

(*--algorithm futex

variables
    mem = [x \in Addresses |-> Free],
    a \in Addresses,
    ...

In addition to modeling Processes, my futex model also models a set of memory address as Addresses. I also defined three constants: Free, Acquired, Contended which have the same role as FREE, ACQUIRED, and CONTENDED in the example C code above.

I model memory as a function (mem) that maps addresses to values, as well as a specific memory address (a). I use a as my futex.

At the top-level, the algorithm should look familiar, it’s basically the same as the mutex.tla one, except that it’s calling acquire_lock and release_lock procedures.

process proc \in Processes
begin
    ncs: skip;
    acq: call acquire_lock();
    cs:  skip;
    rel: call release_lock();
         goto ncs;
end process;

acquire_lock: implementing lock

I based my implementation of the lock on a simplified version of the one in Ulrich Drupper’s Futexes are Tricky paper.

Here’s the model for acquiring the lock. It doesn’t render particularly well in WordPress, so you may want to view the futex.tla file on GitHub directly.

procedure acquire_lock()
variable lprev;
begin
           \* Attempt to acquire the lock
Lcmpx1:    atomic_compare_exchange(mem[a], lprev, Free, Acquired);
Ltest:     while lprev # Free do
              \* Mark the lock as contended, assuming it's in the acquired state
Lcmpx2:       atomic_compare_exchange(mem[a], lprev, Acquired, Contended);
              if lprev # Free then
call_wait:        call futex_wait(a, Contended);
              end if;
              \* Attempt to acquire the lock again
Lcmpx3:       atomic_compare_exchange(mem[a], lprev, Free, Contended);
           end while;
            \* if we reach here, we have the lock
Lret:      return;
end procedure;

Note that we need three separate atomic_compare_exchange calls to implement this (each with different arguments!). Yipe!

release_lock: implementing unlock

The unlock implementation is much simpler. We just set the futex to Free and then wake the waiters.

procedure release_lock()
variable uprev;
begin
u_xch:  atomic_exchange(mem[a], uprev, Free);
u_wake: if uprev = Contended then
           call futex_wake(a);
        end if;
u_ret:  return;
end procedure;

Modeling the futex_wait/futex_wake calls

Finally, it’s not enough in our model to just invoke futex_wait and futex_wake, we need to model the behavior of these as well! I’ll say a little bit about the relevant kernel data structures in the Linux kernel and how I modeled them

Kernel data structures

The Linux kernel hashes futexes into buckets, and each of these bucket is associated with a futex_hash_bucket structure. For the purposes of our TLA+ model, the fields we care about are:

  • queue of threads (tasks) that are waiting on the futex
  • lock for protecting the structure

The kernel also uses a structure called a wake-queue (see here for more details) to keep a list of the tasks that have been selected to be woken up. I modeled this list of threads-to-be-woken as a set.

Here are the variables:

variables
...
    waitq = [x \in Addresses |-> <<>>], \* a map of addresses to wait queues
    qlock = {},  \* traditional mutex lock used by the kernel on the wait queue.
    wake = {}; \* processes that have been sent a signal to wake up

I made the following assumptions to simplify my model

  • every futex (address) is associated with one queue, rather than hashing and bucketing
  • I used a global lock instead of having a per-queue lock

futex_wait

Here’s the basic futex_wait algorithm (links go to Linux source code)

  1. Take the lock
  2. Retrieve the current value of the futex.
  3. Check if the passed value matches the futex value. If not, return.
  4. Add the thread to the wait queue
  5. Release the lock
  6. Wait to be woken up

Note: I assume that calling schedule() inside of the kernel at this point has the effect of putting the thread to sleep, but as I said earlier, I’m not a kernel programmer so I’m not familiar with this code at all.

Here’s my PlusCal model:

procedure futex_wait(addr, val)
begin
wt_acq:       await qlock = {};
              qlock := {self};
wt_valcheck:  if val /= mem[addr] then
                qlock := {};
                return;
              end if;
              \* Add the process to the wait queue for this address
wt_enq:       waitq[addr] := Append(waitq[addr], self);
              qlock := {};
wt_wait:      await self \in wake;
              wake := wake \ {self};
              return;
end procedure;

futex_wake

Here’s what the futex_wake algorithm looks like:

  1. Take the lock
  2. Add the tasks to be woken up to the wake queue
  3. Release the lock
  4. Wake the tasks on the wake queue

Here’s my PlusCal model of it. I chose to wake only one process in my model, but we could have have woken all of the waiting processes.

procedure futex_wake(addr)
variables nxt = {}
begin
wk_acq:   await qlock = {};
          qlock := {self};
wk_deq:   if waitq[addr] /= <<>> then
              nxt := {Head(waitq[addr])};
              waitq[addr] := Tail(waitq[addr]);
          end if;
wk_rel:   qlock := {};
wk_wake:  wake := wake \union nxt;
          return;
end procedure;

You can see the full model on GitHub at futex.tla.

Checking for properties

One of the reasons to model in TLA+ is to check properties of the specification. I care about three things with this specification:

  1. It implements mutual exclusion
  2. It doesn’t make system calls when there’s no contention
  3. Processes can’t get stuck waiting on the queue forever

Mutual exclusion

We check mutual exclusion the same way we did in our mutex.tla specification, by asserting that there are never two different processes in the critical section at the same time. This is our invariant.

MutualExclusion == \A p1,p2 \in Processes : pc[p1]="cs" /\ pc[p2]="cs" => p1=p2

No contention means no system calls

The whole point of using futexes to implement locks was to avoid system calls in the cases where there’s no contention. Even if our algorithm satisfies mutual exclusion, that doesn’t mean that it avoids these system calls.

I wrote an invariant for the futex_wait system call, that asserts that we only make the system call when there’s contention. I called the invariant OnlyWaitUnderContention, and here’s how I defined it. I created several helper definitions as well.

LockIsHeld == mem[a] /= Free
ProcessAttemptingToAcquireLock(p) == pc[p] \in {"Lcmpx1", "Ltest", "Lcmpx2", "call_wait", "Lcmpx3", "wt_acq", "wt_valcheck", "wt_enq", "wt_wait"}
Contention == LockIsHeld /\ \E p \in Processes : ProcessAttemptingToAcquireLock(p)
OnlyWaitUnderContention == \E p \in Processes : pc[p]="call_wait" => Contention

Nobody gets stuck waiting

Recall earlier in the blog post how we had to modify the prototype of the futex_wait system call to take an additional argument, in order to prevent a race condition that could leave a process waiting forever on the queue.

We want to make sure that we have actually addressed that risk. Note that the comments in the Linux source code specifically call out this risk.

I checked this by defining an invariant that stated that it never can happen that a process is waiting and all of the other processes are past the point where they could wake up the waiter.

Stuck(x) == /\ pc[x] = "wt_wait"
            /\ x \notin wake
            /\ \A p \in Processes \ {x} : \/ pc[p] \in {"ncs", "u_ret"}
                                          \/ /\ pc[p] \in {"wk_rel", "wk_wake"}
                                             /\ x \notin nxt[p]

NoneStuck == ~ \E x \in Processes : Stuck(x)

Final check: refinement

In addition to checking mutual exclusion, we can check that our futex-based lock model (futex.tla) implements our original high-level mutex model (mutex.tla) by means of a refinement mapping.

To do that, we need to define mappings between the futex model variables and the mutex model variables. The mutex model has two variables:

  • lock – the model of the lock
  • pc – the program counters for the processes

I called my mappings lockBar and pcBar. Here’s what the mapping looks like:

InAcquireLock(p) == pc[p] \in {"Lcmpx1", "Ltest", "Lcmpx2", "call_wait", "Lcmpx3", "Lret"}
InFutexWait(p) == pc[p] \in {"wt_acq", "wt_valcheck", "wt_enq", "wt_wait"}
InReleaseLockBeforeRelease(p) == pc[p] \in {"u_xch"}
InReleaseLockAfterRelease(p) == pc[p] \in {"u_wake", "u_ret"}
InFutexWake(p) == pc[p] \in {"wk_acq", "wk_deq", "wk_rel", "wk_wake"}

lockBar == {p \in Processes: \/ pc[p] \in {"cs", "rel"}
                             \/ InReleaseLockBeforeRelease(p)}


pcBar == [p \in Processes |->
            CASE pc[p] = "ncs"                 -> "ncs"
              [] pc[p] = "cs"                  -> "cs"
              [] pc[p] = "acq"                 -> "acq"
              [] InAcquireLock(p)              -> "acq"
              [] InFutexWait(p)                -> "acq"
              [] pc[p] = "rel"                 -> "rel"
              [] InReleaseLockBeforeRelease(p) -> "rel"
              [] InReleaseLockAfterRelease(p)  -> "ncs"
              [] InFutexWake(p)                -> "ncs"
]

mutex == INSTANCE mutex WITH lock <- lockBar, pc <- pcBar

We can then define a property that says that our futex specification implements the mutex specification:

ImplementsMutex == mutex!Spec

Finally, in our futex.cfg file, we can specify that we want to check the invariants, as well as this behavioral property. The relevant config lines look like this:

INVARIANT
    MutualExclusion
    OnlyWaitUnderContention
    NoneStuck

PROPERTY 
    ImplementsMutex

You can find my repo with these models at https://github.com/lorin/futex-tla.