One of the topics I wrote about in my last post was about using formal methods to build a model of how our software behaves. In this post, I want to explore how the software we write itself contains models: models of how the world behaves.
The most obvious area is in our database schemas. These schemas enable us to digitally encode information about some aspect of the world that our software cares about. Heck, we even used to refer to this encoding of information into schemas as data models. Relational modeling is extremely flexible: in principle, we can represent just about any aspect of the world into it, if we put enough effort in. The challenge is that the world is messy, and this messiness significantly increases the effort required to build more complete models. Because we often don’t even recognize the degree of messiness the real world contains, we build over-simplified models that are too neat. This is how we end up with issues like the ones captured in Patrick McKenzie’s essay Falsehoods Programmers Believe About Names. There’s a whole book-length meditation on the messiness of real data and how it poses challenges for database modeling: Data and Reality by William Kent, which is highly recommended by Hillel Wayne, in his post Why You Should Read “Data and Reality”.
The problem of missing the messiness of the real world is not at all unique to software engineers. For example, see Christopher Alexander’s A City Is Not a Tree for a critique of urban planners’ overly simplified view of human interactions in urban environments. For a more expansive lament, check out James C. Scott’s excellent book Seeing Like a State. But, since I’m a software engineer and not an urban planner or a civil servant, I’m going to stick to the software side of things here.
Models in the back, models in the front
In particularly, my own software background is in the back-end/platform/infrastructure space. In this space, the software we write frequently implement control systems. It’s no coincidence that both cybernetics and kubernetes derived their names from the same ancient Greek word: κυβερνήτης. Every control system must contain within it a model of the system that it controls. Or, as Roger C. Conant and W. Ross Ashby put it, every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system.
Things get even more complex on the front-end side of the software world. This world must bridge the software world with the human world. In the context of Richard Cook’s framing in Above the Line, Below the Line, the front-end is the line that bridges the two world. As a consequence, the front-end’s responsibility is to expose a model of the software’s internal state to the user. This means that the front-end also has an implicit model of the users themselves. In the paper Cognitive Systems Engineering: New wine in new bottles, Erik Hollnagel and David Woods referred to this model as the image of the operator.
The dangers of the wrongness of models
There’s an oft-repeated quote by the statistician George E.P. Box: “All models are wrong but some are useful”. It’s a true statement, but one that focuses only on the upside of wrong models, the fact that some of them are useful. There’s also a downside to the fact that all models are wrong: the wrongness of these models can have drastic consequences.
And, while It’s a true statement, but what it fails to hint at how bad the consequences can be when a model is wrong. One of my favorite examples involves the 2008 financial crisis, as detailed by the journalist Felix Salmon’s 2009 Wired Magazine article Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street. The article described how Wall Street quants used a mathematical model known as the Gaussian copula function to estimate risk. It was a useful model that ultimately led to disaster.
Here’s A ripped-from-the-headlines example of image of the operator model error, how the U.S. national security advisor Mike Waltz accidentally saved the phone number of Jeffrey Goldberg, editor of the Atlantic magazine, to the contact information of White House spokesman Brian Hughes. The source is the recent Guardian story How the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg got added to the White House Signal group chat:
According to three people briefed on the internal investigation, Goldberg had emailed the campaign about a story that criticized Trump for his attitude towards wounded service members. To push back against the story, the campaign enlisted the help of Waltz, their national security surrogate.
Goldberg’s email was forwarded to then Trump spokesperson Brian Hughes, who then copied and pasted the content of the email – including the signature block with Goldberg’s phone number – into a text message that he sent to Waltz, so that he could be briefed on the forthcoming story.
Waltz did not ultimately call Goldberg, the people said, but in an extraordinary twist, inadvertently ended up saving Goldberg’s number in his iPhone – under the contact card for Hughes, now the spokesperson for the national security council.
…
According to the White House, the number was erroneously saved during a “contact suggestion update” by Waltz’s iPhone, which one person described as the function where an iPhone algorithm adds a previously unknown number to an existing contact that it detects may be related.
The software assumed that, when you receive a text from someone with a phone number and email address, that the phone number and email address belong to the sender. This is a model of the user that turned out to be very, very wrong.
Nobody expects model error
Software incidents involve model errors in one way or another, whether it’s an incorrect model of the system being controlled, an incorrect image of the operator, or a combination of the two.
And, yet, despite us all intoning “all models are wrong, some models are useful”, we don’t internalize that our systems our built on top of imperfect models. This is one of the ironies of AI: we are now all aware of the risks associated with model error with LLMs. We’ve even come up with a separate term for it: hallucinations. But traditional software is just as vulnerable to model error as LLMs are, because our software is always built on top of models that are guaranteed to be incomplete.
You’re probably familiar with the term black swan, popularized by the acerbic public intellectual Nassim Nicholas Taleb. While his first book, Fooled by Randomness, was a success, it was the publication of The Black Swan that made Taleb a household name, and introduced the public to the concept of black swans. While the term black swan was novel, the idea it referred to was not. Back in the 1980s, the researcher Zvi Lanir used a different term: fundamental surprise. Here’s an excerpt of a Richard Cook lecture on the 1999 Tokaimura nuclear accident where he talks about this sort of surprise (skip to the 45 minute mark).
And this Tokaimura accident was an impossible accident.
There’s an old joke about the creator of the first English American dictionary, Noah Webster … coming home to his house and finding his wife in bed with another man. And she says to him, as he walks in the door, she says, “You’ve surprised me”. And he says, “Madam, you have astonished me”.
The difference was that she of course knew what was going on, and so she could be surprised by him. But he was astonished. He had never considered this as a possibility.
And the Tokaimura was an astonishment or what some, what Zev Lanir and others have called a fundamental surprise which means a surprise that is fundamental in the sense that until you actually see it, you cannot believe that it is possible. It’s one of those “I can’t believe this has happened”. Not, “Oh, I always knew this was a possibility and I’ve never seen it before” like your first case of malignant hyperthermia, if you’re a an anesthesiologist or something like that. It’s where you see something that you just didn’t believe was possible. Some people would call it the Black Swan.
Black swans, astonishment, fundamental surprise, these are all synonyms for model error.
And these sorts of surprises are going to keep happening to us, because our models are always wrong. The question is: in the wake of the next incident, will we learn to recognize that fundamental surprises will keep happening to us in the future? Or will we simply patch up the exposed problems in our existing models and move on?
Surfing Complexity 